







During the last decade, inflation has become a
worldwide concern. At the same time, with the
abandonment of pegged exchange rates under
the Bretton Woods system, member countries of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have
become free to choose theirexchange-rate policy
under general IMF surveillance. I How to exer-
cise this freedom so as to minimize domestic
price inflation is obviously a question ofconsid-
erable policy interest.
The purpose of this paper is to utilize eco-
nomic analysis and empirical evidence to shed
light on the subject of exchange rates and dom-
estic inflation. We start with a simple model ofa
small two-sector ec.onomy-a tradable-good
sector and a nontradable-good sector. With this
model, we compare how various types ofdistur-
bances to the national economy (e.g., world
inflation, capital flows, domesticwage increases,
crop failures, monetary expansion) affect the
domestic price level under fixed and flexible
exchange rates. A large number of cases are
analyzed, corresponding to the various alleged
causes of inflation, to see if the choice of
exchange-rate policy makes a systematic differ-
ence in the extent to which the domestic price
level is affected by various internal and external
disturbances.
The analysis shows, first, that in an open
economy, any inflationary disturbance from
whatever source always manifests itself as a
pressure in the foreign-exchange market, in the
form of a reserve change or an exchange-rate
adjustment (or a combination of the two). The
analysis also shows that the essence of an
exchange-rate policy lies in a deliberate policy
choice regarding the distribution of the
"exchange-rate market pressure2" between re-
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serve changes and exchange-rate adjustments.
Depending on the source of inflation, the
exchange-market manifestation may be an up-
ward pressure on the national currency (i.e.
exchange appreciation orreserve accumulation)
or a downward pressure (exchange depreciation
or reserve depletion). In the case of an upward
pressure, exchange appreciation would always
result in less domestic-price increase thanreserve
accumulation; in the case of a downward pres-
sure, on the other hand, reserve depletion would
always result in less domestic inflation than
exchange depreciation. Thus, an optimal
exchange-rate policy for minimizing domestic
inflation would be topermitexchange apprecia-
tion and resist depreciation, regardless of the
source of inflationary disturbances. Since the
manifestations of the exchange-market pressure
are readily observable, and the exact nature of
the underlying inflationary disturbances is not,
this policy rule would make policy choices con-
siderably easier and more operational than hav-
ing to decide about the sources of inflation-
imported or ofdomestic origin, demand-pull or
cost-push, attributable to monetary or real fac-
tors.
We have applied the rule to assess the actual
exchange-rate policies and inflation experiences
offour Pacific Basin countries: Japan, the Phil-
ippines, Korea, and Taiwan, during the 1968-78
period. Buffeted by both internal and external
disturbances, the four countries experimented
with a variety of exchange-rate policies during
this period. Japan floated in 1973; the Philip-
pines nominally floated in 1970 but in fact
pursued a flexible-peg approach; Korea original-
ly floated but then shifted to a pegged rate in
1972; and Taiwan maintained a pegged rate until
the very end of the period, when it adopted a
floating rate.Despite the variety of avowed exchange-rate
policies, all four countries exceptJapanexhibit-
ed a greater readiness to depreciate the currency
than to appreciate. Even in Japan's case, both
appreciations and depreciations were tempered
by a "leaning-against-the-wind" policy, whereby
the Bank of Japan intervened in the market to
slow down or moderate the extent ofexchange-
rate fluctuations.3 The aversion to currency
appreciation resulted in rapid moneygrowthand
inflation in a number of episodes, notably for
Japanduring 1970-72, Koreaduring 1975-77,the
Philippines during 1972-73, and Taiwan during
1972-73 and 1976-78. Actual currency deprecia-
tions meanwhile resulted in higher domestic-
price increases than would have occurred under
fixed-rate regimes, in Japan during 1973-75, the
Philippines during 1970-71, and Korea in 1970-
72 and 1975-77.
This informal survey of inflation experiences
indicates that domestic inflation in the four
countries might have been lower had they adop-
ted optimal exchange-rate policies.
Finally, several caveats are in order. First, it
should be borne in mind that the "optimality" of
exchange-rate policy is defined in this paper
solely in terms of reducing domestic inflation in
the face ofinternalandexternaldisturbances. As
important as that objective may be, policy-
makers might well have otherobjectives in mind,
e.g., domestic income stabilization and econom-
ic growth. Hence, although a less-than-optimal
exchange-rate policy in the present context
means a higher domestic inflation rate than
otherwise, it does not necessarily imply a wrong
policy. Second, the recommendation for resist-
ing depreciation as an anti-inflation policy is
predicated on the assumption thattheexchange-
marketpressure is transitory, orthatappropriate
adjustment mechanisms can work rapidly
enough to restore balance in the nation'sinterna-
tional payments before its foreign reserves or
foreign-credit facilities are seriously depleted.
Specifically, it is not an endorsementofa pegged
exchange rate under continuing domestic infla-
tion, with the exchange rate sustained byexten-
sive trade and exchange restrictions. Third, the
assumption ofa "small open economy," defined
in the next section, should be underscored. This
implies that foreign repercussions of the coun-
try's policy actions can be ignored. The analysis
is particularly inapplicable to large economies
such as the United States, whose economic
activities significantlyaffect the rest ofthe world.
I. Framework of Analysis
The analytical framework presented in this
paper is one familiar in the literature on policy
choice for maintaining internal and external
balance. This approach, pioneered by Robert
Mundell, Marcus Fleming and others, is simpli-
fied here by assuming full-employment output
and no bond market, so as to focus on the
relationship between the exchange rate and the
domestic price level.4 Thosewho are notinterest-
ed in formal economic analysis may skip to the
next section, where the analytical results are
summarized.
We also assume in this analysis that the coun-
try is a price taker in the world market for both
its exports and its imports. That is to say, it
possesses nomonopolisticpoweroverits exports
and no monopsonistic power overits imports, so
that the world demand for its exports and the
supply of its imports are both perfectly elastic.
Moreover, terms-of-trade changes are ignored,
51
so that the country's exports and imports are
regarded as one good, a "tradable good," in
distinction to another good, the "nontradable
good."
Both the tradable good and the nontradable
good are produced and consumed by the resi-
dents of the country. The production of each
good is assumed to depend only on the relative
prices ofthe two, while the demand depends on
real income, relative prices, and real money
balances. The price of the nontradable good is
determined by the domestic demand and supply
conditions in that market. The price of the
tradable good, on the other hand, is equal to its
given foreign price multiplied by the exchange
rate, which is defined as the price ofthe foreign
currency in terms of the national currency.
Under flexible rates, the exchange rate is deter-
mined by supply and demand in the foreign-
exchange market, which in turn depends onthenation's trade balance and exogenously-given
netcapitalflows. Underfixed exchangerates, the
exchange rate is by definition set by the mone-
tary authorities through exchange-market inter-
ventions, with resultant changes in the central
bank's foreign reserves and the domestic money
supply.
Finally, in order to simplify the analysis,.we
assume that both consumers and producers are
devoid of "money illusion"; that is to say, the
demand and supply ofeach good are dependent
only on real magnitudes and relative prices, so
that proportionate changes in all prices and the
money supply would leave both demand and
supply unaffected.5 This money-neutrality as-
sumption, which is standard in neo-classical
economic theory, insures the same proportional-
ity of all price changes as a given change in the
money supply.6
Considernow varioussourcesofinflation, and
compare how the aggregate price level-defined
as a weighted average of the two commodity
prices-would be affected under fixed and flexi-
ble exchange rates. FouF types of disturbances
may be distinguished: foreign price increases,
domestic credit expansion,autonomouschanges
in domestic demand or supply in the two goods
markets, and net international capital flows.
Obviously, these four types cover a very large
variety of disturbances which can be sources of
inflation in a country opento internationaltrade
and capital flows.
The four types of disturbances affect the
domestic price level through their effects on the
demand and supply oftradable and nontradable
goods. Three types ofimpacts are considered in
this model: a "relative price effect," a "real
balance effect," and a "real income effect." The
first refers to the response of the domestic de-
mand and supply ofthe two goods toa cha.nge in
their relative prices: the quantity supplied is
postulated to rise, and the quantitydemanded to
fall, with a rise in the price ofthegood relative to
that of the other good. In addition, the model
assumes thatdemand is positivelyrelatedtoboth
real income and the real money balance held by
the public-the latter being defined as the nomi-
nal money supply adjusted for changes in the
domestic price level-such that an increase in
either will increase the demand for bothgoods.
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The stability of the two-sector model requires
that the marginal propensity to spend on either
good (the real income effect) be less than unity,
and that the real-balance effect on demand ofa
price change in one sectorbe algebraicallysmall-
er than the sum of its relative-price effects on
both the demand and the supply in that sector.
Finally, the model assumes that changes in the
nominal money supply are determined partly by
changesinthe central bank'sforeign reserves and
partly by domestic credit expansions orcontrac-
tions.
World Price Increase. Under a fixed exchange
rate, the domestic price ofthe tradable good will
rise in proportion to the rise in its world price.
Through the relative-price effect, which by as-
sumption outweighs the real-balance effect, the
domestic output of the tradable good will rise
and the demand for it fall, resulting in an im-
provement in the nation's trade balance, an
increase in its reserves, and domestic monetary
expansion. The monetary expansion, through
the real-balance effect, implies an increase in the
demand for both goods, thus raising the price of
the nontradable good and reducing the trade
surplus. Final equilibrium will be attained in
both markets when both prices have risen pro-
portionately to restore the same relative pricesas
at the initial equilibrium; and thetradesurplus is
completely eliminated.
Under flexible exchange rates, on the other
hand, a world price increase will result in an
appreciation ofthe national currency in propor-
tion to the world price increase, thus leaving the
domestic price ofthe tradable good unchanged.
There is neither a relative-price effect nor a real-
balance effect. Hence, there is no change in the
domestic price level.
Thus, a fixed exchange rate exposes a country
to inflation pressures from abroad,while upward
flexibility of the exchange rate insulates the
domestic price level from such pressures. In both
cases, the world inflation pressures are manifest-
ed in the foreign-exchange market-in the form
of a reserve accumulation in the fixed-rate case
and of exchange-rate appreciation in the
flexible-rate case.
Domestic Credit Expansion. Domestic credit
expansion will result in an increase in the money
supply and, through the real-balance effect, in anincrease in domestic demand in both tradable-
good and nontradable-good markets. Under a
fixed exchange rate, only the nontradable-good
price will rise, as the price ofthe tradablegood is
fixed by its world price and the pegged exchange
rate. As relative prices change, the supply ofthe
tradable good will fall and its demand rise, thus
bringing about a tradedeficit andhenceadecline
in foreign reserves and in the domestic money
supply. Through the real-balanceeffect, demand
will fall back in both markets, until the
nontradable-good price returns to its original
level and the trade deficit is eliminated. Full
equilibrium will be restored when the two prices
and the money supply all fall back to their
respective initial levels. In the end, the only
consequence of the domestic credit expansion is
an exchange ofdomestic assets for foreign assets
in the central bank's portfolio, with no net effect
on either absolute or relative prices, domestic
output or expenditures.
Under a flexible exchange rate, on the other
hand, whenever domestic credit expansion
brings aboutan increase in themoney supply, the
real-balance effect will raise domestic demand in
both tradable-good and nontradable-good mar-
kets, as in the fixed-rate case. However, because
the exchange ratecannow fluctuate, the prices of
both goods are flexible, so that under domestic
demand pressure the prices of both goods will
rise. Full equilibrium will be restored when
prices have risen in proportion to the increase in
the money supply, in accordance with the
money-neutrality assumption.
Thus, when a domestic credit expansion
creates inflation pressure, a fixed exchange rate
relieves that pressure through a trade deficit-
and also sets off an adjustment mechanism,
through reserve depletion and monetary con-
traction, which reduces both the inflation pres-
sure and the trade deficit. A flexible exchange
rate, onthe otherhand, throughexchangedepre-
ciation, seals up the inflation pressure at home,
so thatthefull strengthofthatpressure is exerted
on the domestic price level, as in a closed econo-
my. Again, in bothcases, the inflation pressure is
manifested in the foreign-exchange market-
reserve drain in the fixed-rate case and exchange
depreciation in the flexible-rate case.
Autonomous Demand or Supply Changes.
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Disturbances of this type can occur in either of
the two goods markets. Instead ofanalyzing all
such cases, we shall consider only the case ofa
supply increase-say, due tosuccessfuladoption
of advanced technology-in the tradable-good
sector, and briefly summarize all theotherpossi-
bilities.
Undera fixed exchange rate,anoutputexpan-
sion in the tradable-good sector will result in an
improvement in the nation's trade balance, an
accumulation of reserves, and a monetary ex-
pansion, with no effect on the domestic price of
the tradable good. However, because of the
higher real income and the induced monetary
expansion, domestic demand for bothgoodswill
rise, leading to a rise in the price ofthe nontrad-
able good and a reduction in the trade surplus.
Full equilibrium will be restored when the
nontradable-good price has risen sufficiently for
the relative price-effect to completely offset the
combined real-income and real-balance effects,
and when the trade surplus is completely elimi-
nated. In the end, the domestic price level will be
higher than at the initial equilibrium.
Under a flexible rate, on the other hand,
output expansion in the tradable-good sector
will lead instead to an appreciation ofthe nation-
al currency and a consequent reduction in the
domestic price of the tradable good, with no
effect on the trade balance and the money sup-
ply. Through the relative-price effect, which by
assumption mlJ.st be greater than the real-
balance effect, supply will rise and demand will
fall in the nontradable-good sector, but demand
for the nontradable good will rise because ofthe
real-income effect arising from the output ex-
pansion. The net effect on the price of the
nontradable-good is indeterminate. But regard-
less of the effect on the nontradable-good price,
the aggregate price level will definitely be lower
than at the initial equilibrium.?
Thus, a supply increase in the tradable sector
results in a rise in the price level under a fixed
exchange rate but a decline undera flexible rate.
These different results arise because the distur-
bance leads to a reserve accumulation in the
fixed-rate case and to exchange appreciation in
the flexible-rate case. Again, the form in which
the disturbance manifests itself in the foreign-
exchange market, as determined by theexchange-rate policy, makes a critical difference
in its impact on the domestic price level.
Without going through the analysis, we shall
merely note that a supply increase in the non-
tradable sector will result in a decline in the
domestic price level under both a fixed and a
flexible exchange rate. Thedecline will be small-
er under the former than under the latter, the
difference again being due to the resultant re-
serve accumulation (hence monetaryexpansion)
in the fixed-rate case and to exchange apprecia-
tion in theflexible-ratecase. Moreover,aswould
be expected, the results of supply decreases are
symmetrical (i.e., of opposite signs) to those of
supply increases, and those of demand changes
symmetrical to those of corresponding supply
changes.
Capital Flows. Capital flows affect the dom-
estic price level indirectly through their impact
on the exchange rate or on foreign reserves.
Under a flexible rate, a net capital outflow will
result in a depreciation ofthe national currency,
thus directly raising the price of the tradable
good and indirectly raising that ofthe nontrad-
able good through the relative-price effect. The
domestic price level will definitely be higher.
Under a fixed rate, on the otherhand, thecapital
outflow will result in a reserve loss, monetary
contraction, and (through the real-balance ef-
fect) in a reduction indemand for bothgoods. At
thefinal equilibrium, the domestic price level will
be lower than at the initial equilibrium. A net
capital inflow will have exactly the opposite
results. Again, the exchange-rate policy makes a
critical difference in the response ofthe domestic
price level to the given disturbance, depending
on whether the exchange-market pressure is
manifested in exchange-rate adjustments or in
reserve changes.
Our purpose is to construct a model that can
analyze the impact on the domestic price level of
all such disturbances, and see if any generaliza-
tion could be derived from the results that might
be useful to policymakers. The results are sum-
marized in Figure 1.
II. Analytical Results
So far, we have examined the impact on the
domestic price level of four types of distur-
bances: foreign price increases, domestic credit
expansions, domestic demand orsupply shocks,
and international capital flows. A large number
of cases have been analyzed, because in reality
inflation can be attributed to a variety ofcauses.
Figure 1































Symbols: "0" denotes no change in the domestic price level.
"+" denotes a rise in the domestic pricelevel.
"++" denotes a larger rise in the domestic price level than would occur under the fixed-rate case.
"-" denotes a fall in the domestic price level.
"--" denotes a larger fall in the domestic price level than would occur under the fixed-rate case.
54In anopeneconomy,as shownin Figure I, any
disturbance to the economyis always reflected in
the foreign-exchange market, either as a reserve
change under fixed exchange rates or as an
exchange-rate adjustment under flexible ex-
change rates. Moreover, the various types of
disturbances may result in either an upward
exchange-market pressure on the national cur-
rency (i.e. a reserve increase or an exchange
appreciation) or a downward pressure (i.e. a
reserve decrease or an exchange depreciation).
Where the exchange-market pressure is
upward-as in the case of a foreign-price in-
crease, an expansion in domesticsupplyofeither
good, or a net capital inflow-a flexible-rate
policy permitting appreciation would in every
case result in a smaller price increase ora larger
price decline thanwould occurundera fixed-rate
policy. Conversely, where the market pressure is
downward-as in the case of a domestic credit
expansion, a contraction in domestic supply in
either market, or a net capital outflow-a fixed-
rate policydrawingdown reserves would in every
case lead to a smaller price rise or a larger price
decline than would occur under a flexible-rate
policy. Thus, an exchange-rate policy designed
to minimize domestic price inflation should
permit exchange appreciation and resist depre-
ciation, regardless of the source of inflation.
The rationale behind this policy rule can be
better understood by considering the relation-
ship between the exchange-market pressure and
changes in the domestic price level. The foreign-
exchange market is like a set ofvalves adjusting
the reciprocal excess demand or supply of na-
tional currencies through changes in their ex-
change rates. An upward pressure signals an
excess demand for the national currencies by the
holders of foreign currencies, because of their
desire to acquire the goods, services, and finan-
cial assets denominated in the nation's currency.
(For brevity, call it the "foreign" excess demand,
even though it refers to that of the holders of
foreign currencies, be they domestic or foreign
residents.) A fixed-exchange-rate policy would
keep the adjustment valves wide open, thus
allowing the foreign excess demand to spill fully
into the domestic market and raise the domestic
price level. A flexible-rate policy, on the other
hand, would shut off the valves by making the
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national currency dearer in terms of foreign
currencies, thereby discouraging the foreign
excess demand from the national market. Under
these circumstances, a flexible-rate policy per-
mitting exchange appreciation is clearly to be
preferred.
A downward pressure, on the other hand,
signals an excess demand for foreign currencies
by the holders of the national currency, because
of their desire to acquire goods, services,and
financial assets denominated in foreign curren-
cies. (Term it the "domestic" excess demand.) A
flexible-rate policy would again turn off the
valves by making theforeign currenciesdearerin
terms of the national currency. This would shut
in the domestic excess demand and compel it to
apply all its pressure on the domestic price level.
Afixed-rate policy, onthe otherhand, wouldcall
for the central bank to draw down foreign
reserves so as to satisfy the domestic excess
demand for foreign currencies. This would keep
the valves open and thus would channel the
domestic inflation pressure toward foreign
goods, services and financial assets, and away
from the domestic market. In the process, the
central bank would reduce the amount of the
national currency in the public's holdings, and
thus erode the basis of the excess demand for
foreign currencies. Under such circumstances, a
fixed-rate policy would help reduce thedomestic
inflation pressure.
This interpretation helps bring out several
implications ofthe proposedexchange-ratepoli-
cy. First, the policy rule means a deliberate
attempt to shield the nation from foreign infla-
tion pressures and to direct domestic inflation
pressures toward the rest ofthe world. Obvious-
ly, thisasymmetrical policycan be operative only
for those nations thatdo not have toworryabout
repercussions from the rest oftheworld. Foreign
countries, for instance, might reactbyappreciat-
ing theircurrenciesagainst thenation'scurrency,
in effect sealing the inflation pressure within the
nation from which it originates. Alternatively,
where the inflating nation depends on foreign
borrowings to finance its deficits, the foreign
lenders could progressively make their terms of
lendingmore onerous. As for the secondimplica-
tion, the proposed downward exchange-rate
rigidity presumes ample reserves in relation tothe reserve drain, as well as an effective adjust-
ment process for reducing the reserve drain. The
policy is merely a short-run stop-gap measure.
Impeding the adjustment process by continued
domestic monetary expansion, for instance,
would ultimately destroy its usefulness.
III. Experiences of Pacific Basin Countries
With this policy rule in hand, we now turnto average of$6.7 billion a year, in spite of the 18-
examining the inflation and exchange-rateexpe- percent yen appreciation from 1970 to 1972. The
riences of four Pacific Basin countries-Japan, Bank ofJapan responded to this strong upward
Korea, the Philippines, and Taiwan--duringthe pressure with acombinationofexchange-market
1968-78 period. We assess the appropriatenessof interventionsandexchange-rateadjustments. As
their policies from the viewpoint ofminimizing a result of the market interventions, the annual
domestic inflation, to see if the policy rule can money-growth rate rose from an average of 17
help interpret actualevents intheperiodstudied. percent in 1968-70 to an average of27 percent in
The data for the four countries are selected on 1971-72 (Chart 2). As shown inthecentral bank's
the basis of the economic analysis presented balance sheet (Table 1), the 1971-72 increase in
above (Tables 1-4 and Charts 1-2). total assets, amounting to ¥2.8 trillion, was
Japan more than explained by a rise of ¥3.9 trillion in
The Japanese yen was at first pegged to the its foreign-asset holdings. Given the lag between
U.S. dollar, drifted up after August 1971, and monetary expansion and price increases8, the
then officially floated in February 1973. After high money-growth rate of 1971-72 set the stage
that, it fell during the oil crisis and world reces- for the double-digit price inflation in 1973-74.
sion of1974-75,and then rose sharplyin 1976-78. The 1973-74 inflation thus can be traced, at least
During the fixed-rate period of 1968-70, the in part, to the 1971-72 exchange-rate policy.9
exchange-market pressure was relatively mild. Under heavy exchange-market pressure, the
The overall balance-of-payments surplus aver- yen officially floated in February 1973 and
aged a relatively small $1 billion a year. During appreciated by 12 percent on a year-to-year
1971-72, the payments surplus leaped to an average basis. However, during 1973 the
Table 1
Japan: Inflation, Exchange Rates, Balance of Payments and Money, 1968-78
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Inflation Rate' 4.4 6.0 7.8 5.4 4.5 16.5 24.5 8.5 9.4 6.2 3.4
Exchange Rate2 99.5 100.1 100.1 103.0 118.3 132.2 123.0 120.8 120.9 133.6 170.4
Balance of Payments'
Current Account 1.0 2.1 2.0 5.8 6.6 -0.1 -4.7 -0.7 3.7 10.9 17.5
Capital Account -0.2 -1.4 -0.8 4.6 -3.6 -6.2 5.9 0.1 0.1 -4.4 -7.5
Money Growth Rate' 13.4 20.6 16.8 29.7 24.7 16.8 11.5 11.1 12.5 8.2 13.4
Central Bank AssetsS
Total 0.91 0.92 1.08 0.25 2.51 2.04 2.44 1.57 1.19 2.24 n.a.
Foreign Assets 0.32 0.27 0.43 3.03 0.89 -1.89 0.39 -0.22 1.17 1.94 n.a.
Claims on
Government 0.48 0.32 0.33 -l.i6 -0.54 0.47 2.48 3.56 -0.33 -0.47 1.77
Claims on Banks 0.12 0.33 0.32 -1.62 2.17 3.45 -0.44 -1.77 0.35 0.77 0.27
I Percentage change in consumer-price index, fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
2 Exchange rate vs. U.S. dollar, annual average, June 1970=100.
3 Balance on current and capital accounts, in billions of U.S. dollars.
4 Percentage change in M I (currency plus bank demand deposits), year end to year end.
5 Change in assets, in trillions of yen, year end to year end.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
56exchange-market pressure reversed its direction,
as the current-account balance turned into a
small deficit, and a large net capital outflow
occurred. The Bank ofJapanintervened heavily
to support the yen, so that its foreign-exchange
holdings fell from $16.5 billion to $10.2 billion
between year-end 1972 and year-end 1973, while
the money-growth rate dropped from 25 percent
to 17 percentbetween 1972and 1973. Thecentral
Chart 1
bank's total assets rose by ¥2.0 trillion, while
foreign assets declined by ¥ 1.9 .trillion. .The
exchange-market interventions played a signifi-
cant role in reducing money growth in 1973, and
thus contributed to the reduction of inflation
pressures in subsequent years.
The yen continuedtodecline in 1974and 1975.
The Bank of Japan persisted in its policy of
reducing the money-growth rate, bringing it
Chart 2






























































Note: Money-growth changes calculated on a
year-end to year-endbasis, andinflation ratesona

















57down further to 11 percent in 1975. Theinflation
ratefinally camedownfrom24percentin 1974to
8 percent in 1975. However,exchange-ratepoli-
cy apparently contributedlittle to anti-inflation
policy during this period,withlittlecentral-bank
intervention to moderate the yen depreciation.
From 1975 to 1978, the situation again
changed as the yen came under heavy upward
pressure in the exchange market. Japan's
current-account balance swung from a deficit of
$0.7 billion in 1975 toa surplusof$17.5 billionin
1978. Again, the Bank of Japan adopted a
"leaning against the wind" policy ofattempting
to moderate the yen's appreciation by heavy
exchange-market interventions. In 1977-78,
while the yen appreciated by 40 percent, the
Bank ofJapan added $16.5 billion to its foreign
reserves. Although this action went against our
exchange-rate policyrule, theBank ofJapanwas
able to hold the money-growth rateat 11 percent
during the 1977-78 period-about the same as
during 1974-76, but only about half the rate of
the 1971-73 period. As a result, the inflation rate
dropped precipitously from 25 percentin 1974 to
only 3 percent in 1978.
To summarize, Japan's 40-percent exchange
appreciation during 1977-78 was in accordance
with ourexchange-rate policy rule and probably
contributed significantly to the reduction in
Japan's inflation rate. In addition, heavy
exchange-market interventions allowed foreign
excess demand to affect domestic markets, but
the Bank of Japan-through a tight monetary
policy-wasable to offset boththedirect market
impact andthe secondary monetaryimpact. This
experience suggests that our policy rule is by no
means absolute. Otherpolicy measures, suchas a
steady application of tight monetary policy, can
bring inflation under control with little assist-
ance from this source.
The Philippines
After sustaining a deteriorating payments
deficit since 1967, the Philippines abandoned
fixed exchange rates in February 1970-atwhich
point the peso depreciated 39 percent over a
seven-month period. Since September 1970, the
Philippine Bankers Association has set a daily
"guiding rate" for all foreign-exchange transac-
tions, and the central bank has intervened to
keep the peso-dollar rate within the range set by
the Association. Nominally, the daily guiding
rate is free to float, but in fact it has remained
stable and has been adjusted from time to time
only in small steps. For practical purposes, the
Table 2
Philippines: Inflation, Exchange Rates, Balance of Payments and Money, 1968-78
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Inflation Rate' 0.5 2.8 18.7 13.6 5.2 22.6 29.8 1.8 6.7 9.7 8.6
Exchange Rate' 159.3 159.3 102.4 96.4 92.7 91.8 91.4 85.4 83.4 83.8 84.2
Balance of Payments3
Current Account -0.27 -0.25 -0.05 0.00 0.01 0.48 -0.21 -0.92 -1.10 -0.83 -1.22
Capital Account 0.18 0.19 0.13 0.13 0.20 0.19 0.80 0.93 1.05 0.80 2.12
Money Growth Rate' 2.9 22.5 7.3 16.3 29.1 12.3 24.0 14.5 17.1 23.7 13.4
Central Bank Assets'
Total 0.3 0.5 0.7 0.7 2.1 4.0 6.2 3.2 2.0 -1.0 8.3
Foreign Assets --0.1 -0.2 0.7 0.6 1.0 4.3 3.6 -0.4 2.3 -0.7 2.7
Claims on
Government 0.2 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.8 0.3 1.1 -!.l 0.9 0.7 1.5
Claims on Banks 0.2 0.2 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.6 1.5 4.7 -1.2 -1.0 4.1
I Percentage change in consumer-price index, fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
2 Exchange rate vs. U.S. dollar, annual average, June 1970=100.
3 Balance on current and capital accounts, in billions of U.S. dollars.
4 Percentage change in M I (currency plus bank demand deposits), year end to year end.
5 Change in assets, in billions of pesos, year end to yearend.
Source: International Monetary FUnd, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
58peso/dollarrate remained unchangedfrom 1975
to 1978 (Chart I).
After the 1970 devaluation, exchange-market
pressures turned upward on the peso. In 1971
and 1972, the current-account deficits ofpast
years were eliminated, while net capital inflows
continued. Aided by a world commodityboom,
the current-account balance showed a substan-
tial surplus of $480 million in 1973. In the
following year, theworld oil crisisturnedit intoa
deficit of $210 million, but the deficit was more
than offset by a $800 million net capital inflow.
All this would have led one to expect an appre-
ciation ofthe peso from 1970 to 1974; in fact, it
depreciated by II percent. The explanation lies
in the central bank's foreign-exchange pur-
chases, which raised its foreign-exchange re-
serves from $200 million at the end of 1970 to
$1.4 billion at the end of 1974. 10
This policy ofachievingcurrencydepreciation
in the face ofupward exchange-marketpressures
is, ofcourse, exactly opposite to what our policy
rule would suggest for reducing domestic infla-
tion. The central bankdid nottryto use currency
appreciation to discourage foreign excess de-
mand from spillinginto thedomesticmarket, but
rather encouraged this process through deliber-
ate depreciation. Consequently, the money-
growth rate increased from II percent in 1968-70
to 20 percent in 1971-74 (Chart 2). The central
bank's balance sheet shows that73 percentofthe
increase in its total assets during the 1971-74
period was due to foreign-asset accumulation.
Thus, the central bank's exchange-rate policy
apparently aggravated the rapid monetary
growth in 1971-74 and was atleast partlyrespon-
sible for the high inflation rate-averaging 26
percent a year-in 1973-74.
This policy of deliberate depreciation was
abandoned after 1974. As the current-account
balance deteriorated to an average deficit of
about $1 billion a year in 1975-78, the peso was
kept stable largely through heavy foreign bor-
rowings. Although the money-growth rate re-
mained as high as 17 percent, the inflation rate
declined sharply to an average annual rate of7.5
percent from 30 percent in 1974. Since apart
from foreign borrowings, the exchange-market
pressure during the period was clearly down-
ward, the nation's exchange-rate policy ofresist-
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ing depreciation agreed well with ourpolicyrule.
But there was one important exception: Foreign
borrowings enabled thecentralbanktoaddtoits
reserves, and thus thwarted the adjustmentpro-
cess for restoring balance-of-paymentsequilibri-
um through reserve. depletion and monetary
contraction, as envisaged in our model. Pro-
longed continuation ofthis policy could exacer-
bate inflation pressure in the Philippines.
Korea
Korea maintained a flexible exchange rate
from March 1965 to August 1972, with the won-
dollar exchange rate beingset daily bya groupof
designated government-owned exchange banks.
But between August 1972 and December 1974,
Korea maintained the won at a fixed rate of
W400 to the dollar, and then devalued to.W484
(Chart I).
From 1968 to 1971, the exchange-market
pressure was downward on the won, as the
currency depreciated steadily with little official
intervention, except for a period in 1971 when
the Bank ofKorea attempted to slowthe rate of
depreciation. The sourceoftheexchange-market
pressure was an upsurge in monetary growth(32
percent a year) due todomesticcreditexpansion.
Surprisingly, the central bank'sasset portfolio
showed significant increases in foreign-asset
holdings during this period (Table 3).. However,
since Korea's major banks were all government-
owned, the distribution offoreign assets between
the central bank and the commercial banks was
not as meaningful as itwould have been in other
countries. From an examination ofthe balance
sheet of the consolidated banking system, it
becomes clear that the banking system's foreign
assets actually declined during the period, and
that all ofthe rapid monetary growth was due to
banking credits extended to the domestiC sector.
Apparently, Korea's authorities pursued a
policy of liberal credit expansion to finance
domestic economic development, and coupled
this with a flexible exchange rate to free the
authorities from balance-of-payments concerns.
The policy succeeded in providing the country
with a lO-percent annual average growth rate. of
real output during those years. However, italso
led to an II-percent inflation rate during the
1968-71 period~the highest among all four
countries during that period (Chart 2).Korea abandoned the floating exchange rate
in 1972, and accompanied this move withstrict
price controls. The nominal consumer-price
index rose only 5 percentin 1973. Moreover,asa
result of vigorous export growth, the current-
account deficit dropped sharply from $850 mil-
lion in 1971 toanaverage ofonly $340 millionin
1972-73, while net capital inflows continued at
the rate of $700 million a year. The resultant
reserve increases added directly to domestic
money growth and indirectlyalsoencouragedan
acceleration ofdomestic creditexpansion(Table
3). The result was a 43-percent annual money-
growth rate in 1972-73, compared to 19 percent
in 1970-71. The way was thus paved for a steep
price rise, averaging 28 percent a year, in 1974-
75. Since the increase inforeign assetsaccounted
for about one-fourth of the banking system's
total credit expansion of the 1972-73 period, it
appears reasonable that that period's exchange-
rate policy contributed significantlytothesubse-
quent rapid inflation.
The 21-percent devaluation of the won in
December 1974 was a reaction to the sharp
deterioration in Korea's current account as a
result of the oil-price increase and world reces-
sion. The move was perhaps inevitable in view of
Korea's exceedingly slender foreign reserves!!
and its continued domestic credit expansion.
Nevertheless, inflation might have been lower in
1975 had Korea been able to resist devaluation
through, for instance, largerforeign borrowings.
Aside from its inflation effect, thedevaluation
helped set the stage for a remarkablestrengthen-
ing of Korea's international-payments situa-
tion.!2 While foreign borrowing continued at a
high rate, the currentaccountimproved dramati-
cally from an annual average deficit of $2.0
billion in 1974-75 toa smallsurplusin 1977. With
the exchange rate fixed against upward
exchange-market pressure, the central bank's
foreign assets rose rapidly in 1976 and 1977, and
this accounted for 70 percent of the central
bank's asset increase and 35 percent of the
consolidated banking system's total creditexten-
sion in those years. Meanwhile, the money-
growth rate rose from 25 percent in 1975 to 41
percent in 1977. The fixed-exchange-rate policy
under mountingupwardexchange-market press-
ure was clearly incompatible with domestic
Table 3
Korea: Inflation, Exchange Rates, Balance of Payments and Money, 1968-78
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Inflation Rate' 10.2 11.4 13.9 9.7 10.3 5.1 26.6 30.0 8.7 10.8 16.8
Exchange Rate2 111.8 107.2 99.5 88.2 78.6 77.7 76.3 64.0 64.0 64.0 64.0
Balance of Payments'
Current Account -0.44 -0.55 -0.62 -0.85 -0.37 -0.31 -2.03 -1.89 -0.30 0.01 -1.09
Capital Account 0.48 0.71 0.68 0.71 0.70 0.70 1.81 2.21 1.65 1.35 1.25
Money Growth Rate" 44.5 41.8 22.1 16.4 45.1 40.6 29.5 25.0 30.7 40.7 24.9
Central Bank Assets'
Total 42 71 80 -5 195 265 393.7 646.3 686.3 959.1 736.7
Foreign Assets 36 44 22 -24 -16 136 163.9 264.7 560.4 586.3 -200.1
Claims on Gov't -I II 3 -3 144 28 17l.1 362.0 125.6 210.7 292.0
Claims on Banks 7 16 55 22 68 101 386.5 19.6 0.3 162.1 644.8
Banking System Assets'
Total 213 304 216 206 428 671 674 939 1389 1852 2584
Foreign Assets (Net) 5 22 5 -71 68 197 -417 -57 475 666 -254
Domestic Credit 208 282 211 277 360 474 1091 996 914 1186 2838
I Percentage change in consumer-price index, fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
2 Exchange rate vs. U.S. dollar, annual average, June 1970= 100.
3 Balance on current and capital accounts, in billions of U.S. dollars
4 Percentage change in MI (currency plus bank demand deposits), year end to year end.
5 Change in assets, in billions of NT dollars, year end to year end.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various issues.
60monetary stability. The inflation rate thus rose
from 8 percent in 1976 to 17 percent in 1978.
Under these circumstances, our policy rule
would call for currency appreciation to relieve
the inflation pressure. Korea, however, took a
differentroute. Instead ofcurrencyappreciation,
it chose the pathoftrade liberalization toreduce
its paymentssurplus, with suchmeasures as tariff
reductions, abolishment of import quotas, and
official foreign purchases. These measures have
led to a shift in the nation's current account,
resulting in a $l.l-billion deficit in 1978. More-
over, from the viewpoint of long-run economic
growth, the trade-liberalizationmeasuresshould
stimulate improvement in productive efficiency
through enhanced competition. However, great-
er productive efficiency in the Korean context is
likely to mean an accelerated export-growth
rate. Unless import growth cankeep pace, soon-
er or later Korea may have to face up tothe need
for an appropriate exchange-rate policy to re-
duce its very high domestic inflation rate.
Taiwan
Among the countries examined, Taiwan was
the most successful in maintaining domestic
price stabilityduring the1968-78 period.·Except
for the 1973-74 period, the consumer inflation
rate averaged 4.5 percent a year during the
period, compared to 6.2perc:ent for Japan, 7.5
percent for the Philippines, and 10.8 percent for
Korea (Chart 2).
Taiwan was also the only country among the
four that consistently maintained· a fixed
exchange-rate policy. Throughout the eleven-
year period, the New Taiwan dollar (NT) was
pegged to the U.S. dollar~except for a revalua-
tion from NT40 to NT 38 in February 1973, and
another revaluation to NT36 in July 1978 (Chart
1). The 1978 revaluation was accompanied by a
decision to float thecurrency, which was putinto
effect on February 1, 1979, thus officially aban-
doning the long-standing fixed-rate policy.
Taiwan's exchange-ratepolicypresentsanoth-
er example of the difficulty of maintaining a
fixed exchange rate under mounting upward
exchange-market pressure. Since 1968, thecoun-
try's current account improved steadilybecause
of a rising export surplus, except for a major
break in trend that occurred during the oil crisis
and world recession of 1974-75.
Table 4
Taiwan: Inflation, Exchange Rates, Balance of Payments and Money. 1968-78
1968 1969 1970 1971 1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978
Inflation Rate' 8.9 8.5 0.1 1.9 1.6 23.6 34.8 2.2 1.5 8.4 7.1
Exchange Rate' 100 100 100 100 100 104.7 105.4 105.4 105.4 105.4 108.1
Balance of Payments3
Current Account -0.12 -0.03 0.0 0.18 0.52 0.57 -1.11 -0.59 0.32 0.98 1.74
Capital Account 0.01 0.01 0.18 -0.10 -0.18 -0.49 1.18 0.58 0.12 -1.12 -1.68
Money Growth Rate' 9.4 11.1 11.4 24.6 37.9 49.3 7.0 26.9 23.1 29.1 34.1
Central BsrikAssets'
Total 4.0 3.8 8.9 6.2 24.2 25.7 29.7 20.3 44.6 52.2 77.9
Foreign Assets 0.7 5.9 8.8 6.7 23.9 -2.5 0.7 10.1 19.1 -6.0 0.8
Claims on Gov't 1.0 --0.4 0.3 ··2.4 -0.2 1.9 5.3 -2.0 3.1 -2.0 -1.4
Claims on Banks 2.3 -1.7 ..0.2 1.9 0.5 26.3 23.7 12.2 22.4 60.2 78.5
Banking Assets'
Total 6.9 12.8 21.0 27.9 45.8 64.3 61.9 74.0 94.5 148.2 196.6
Foreign Assets (Net) -1.3 2.6 8.6 5.7 24.5 21.4 -21.6 -6.9 38.4 45.9 69.5
Domestic Credit 8.2 10.2 12.4 22.2 21.3 42.9 83.5 80.8 56.0 102.3 127.1
I Percentage change in consumer-price index, fourth quarter to fourth quarter.
2 Exchange rate vs. U.S. dollar, annual average, June 1970=100.
3 Balance. on current and capital accounts, in billions of U.S. dollars.
4 Percentage change in MI (currency plus bank demand deposits), year end to year end.
5 Change in assets, in billions of won, year end to year end.
Source: International Monetary Fund, International Financial Statistics, various ·issues.
61In addition, there were steady net· capital
inflows, although that is not obvious from the
published balance-of-payments data. As inKor-
ea, Taiwan's major commercial banks. are
government-owned and operate under. thecen-
tral bank's direction. At times (e.g., 1973 and
1977), the central bank reduced its foreign-asset
holdings, but the commercial banks increased
their holdings by much larger amounts. These
increases by conventionareconsideredas private
capital outflows, so that published.balance-of-
payments data show a substantial net capital
outflow in both years (Table 4). However, the
dataare misleading since thebalancesheetofthe
consolidated banking system shows large in-
creases in the banking system's foreign assets in
both years.
Thus, from 1968 to' 1973, Taiwanattemptedto
maintain a fixed exchange rate under mounting
upward exchange-market pressure. Atfirst, the
pressure was relatively small, so that the money
supply increased at 10.5 percent a year during
1968-70-remarkably low considering that real
output increased almost as. fast during that
period. The relatively low money-growth rate of
1968-70 helps to account for the sustained low
inflation rate, averaging 1.2 percent a year,
during 1970-72 (Chart 2). However, from 1970
on, the money-growth rate accelerated steadily
and steeply to reach 49 percent a year in 1973.
During the four years 1970-73, foreign assets
accounted for 38 percent of the total credits
extended by the consolidated banking system;
even more remarkably, from 1969 to 1972, for-
eign assets accounted for more than the total
credits extended by the central bank. After
considerable lag, the accelerating money growth
finally hit the economy, and the consumer price
index jumped 24 percent in 1973. The 1973
revaluation of 5.3 percent was apparently too
small to be effectual, as foreign assets continued
to accumulate in the banking system and money
growth continued to accelerate throughout that
year.
The oil shock and the world recession in 1974-
75 saved Taiwan from the need for further
currency revaluations, by bringing to an end the
steady string of current-account surpluses. The
$1.1 billion current-account deficit in 1974
helped the money-growth rate to drop precipi-
tously from 49 percent in 1973 to only 7 percent
in 1974. But the rapid money growth of prior
years continued to exert its toll, as the inflation
rate rose to 35 percent in 1974. Nevertheless, the
monetary contraction of 1974 helped bring
about a sharp deceleration in inflation, with the
inflation rate declining to only 2.2 percent a year
in 1975.
But with the subsequent world economic re-
covery, Taiwan resumed its steady export
growth, so that its current account swungfroma
deficit of $0.6 billion in 1975 to a $1.7-billion
surplus in 1978. As reserve accumulation re-
sumed and the money-growth rate accelerated to
23 percent in 1978, the stage was set for are-run
ofthe scenario thathad precipitatedthe currency
revaluation of February 1973
In July 1978, the central bankagain responded
with a small currency appreciation of 5.5 per-
cent, but this time also announced a decision to
abandon the fixed rate. Thedecisionwas official-
ly implemented on February 1, 1979, although de
facto changes in the exchange rate have since
been very small. A replay of the earlier story
remained a distinct possibility, untilthe 1979 oil-
price increases again disrupted the upward trend
in the current-account surplus.
IV. Conclusion
The exchange-rate and inflation experiences
of the four Pacific Basin countries during the
1968-78 period provide a wide range ofcasesfor
testing the validity and relevance of the mOdel
presented in this paper. Even thoughwe have not
attempted a formal statistical testing, We have
obtained several useful insights fromthissurvey.
First, in a number ofepisodes, exchange-rate
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policies affected domestic price levels in an
important way. In particular, all four countries
experienced rapid monetary growth during
1971-73-the exact years varying from country
to country-as a result of their resistance to
currency appreciation during a period of strong
upward exchange-market pressures. In all cases
except Korea, reserve accumulation apparentlyaccounted for most of the rapid monetary
growth. (Korea's monetarygrowthwas dominat-
ed by domestic credit expansion, although
foreign-asset accumulation was also an import-
ant factor.) Given the lags between money-
growth changes and their impact on the price
level, it appears reasonable to inferthatthe 1971-
73 exchange-rate policies of the four Pacific
Basin countries aggravated their inflation prob-
lem in 1974-75.
Second, in the case of downward exchange-
market pressures, our analysis suggests resisting
jepreciation and using reserve depletion to help
bring about a monetary contraction. All four
countries experienced strong downward pres-
sures during 1974-75; but all except Taiwan
responded by letting their currencies depreciate.
Taiwan, in contrast, relied on a heavy reserve
drain to effect a sharp drop in its money-growth
rate, from 49 percent in 1973 to7percent in 1974.
It paid dearly for the monetary contraction, as
real output grew only 2.2 percent in 1975, com-
pared to its lOA-percent average growth during
the 1963-73 period. 13 But on the other hand,
Taiwan's inflation rate dropped precipitously
from 35 percent in 1974 toonly 2percent in 1975.
Third, the evidence suggests that our policy
rule is not a necessary condition for domestic
price stabilization. Japan intervened heavily in
the exchange market to moderate yen apprecia-
tion in 1968-78. Nevertheless, Japan also
managed to hold down the money-growth rate,
and thus successfully wound downinflationover
a several-year period. Korea similarly was un-
willing to appreciate its currency in the face of
mounting exchange-market pressure; but
through drastic trade-liberalization measures, it
was able to reduce its payments surplus in 1978
and win at least a temporary respite from the
exchange-market pressure. Thus, our policyrule
is by no means absolute. The same anti-inflation
policy objective could be achieved through mea-
sures other than an appropriate exchange-rate
policy.
Finally, the suggested policy rule must be
taken in its proper context. For analytical pur-
poses, we assume that reducing domestic infla-
tion is the only policy objective, that adequate
foreign reserves orinternationalcreditsareavail-
able on reasonable terms for financing tempor-
ary payments deficits, and thatpolicymakerscan
permit an effective adjustment process (includ-
ing monetary contraction) to correct a sustained
payments imbalance. But in reality, not all of
these conditions can be satisfied. For example,
Korea probably had no choice but currency
depreciation in 1968-71 and again in 1974, given
the small size ofher foreign reserves and a credit
policy which was designed to promote domestic
investment. Moreover,allfourcountriesexhibit-
ed a strong aversion to currency appreciation
and a strong preference for currency
depreciation-an attitude exactly opposite to
what our policy rule would prescribe. Presuma-
bly, their policy attitudes stemmed from other
objectives, such as export competitiveness and
income growth. Whether such an attitude is
rational or not is a separate issue. What is
relevant is that a "sub-optimal" exchange-rate
policy incurs a cost in terms of a higher-than-
necessary inflation rate.
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